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B o o k  r e v i e w 
Adolescence in lifespan perspective 
Laurence Steinberg, Age of opportunity: Lessons from the 
new science of adolescence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
Boston, 2014, ISBN: 978-0-544-27977-3 (cloth), 264 pp., 
$28 
Adolescence, argues Laurence Steinberg in Age of opportunity, is the 
new zero-to-three. Noting the extensive publicity regarding evidence 
of the developmental plasticity of the very young brain, Steinberg 
writes, “We now know that adolescence is a similarly remarkable pe-
riod of brain reorganization and plasticity” (p. 22). 
As indicated in the subtitle, the book’s intent is to provide “lessons 
from the new science of adolescence.” What is the new science of ad-
olescence? Brain science. And what are its lessons? The primary les-
son is that brain plasticity decreases after the first few years of life 
but then returns to a high level in adolescence, which Steinberg de-
fines as the period fromabout age 10 (reflecting the declining age of 
puberty) to about age 25 (reflecting recent delays in the United States 
and elsewhere in adopting adult roles). He claims that “psychologi-
cal change during adolescence is far more dramatic than it is in mid-
dle childhood” (p. 41). 
The second half of the book focuses on applying what we know 
to promote adolescentwelfare and development. I have argued else-
where against the sorts of categorical restrictions Steinberg and others 
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believe can be justified by brain immaturity (Moshman, 2011b, 2013). 
Steinberg’s recommendations to parents of adolescents, on the other 
hand, seem beyond question: We should focus on rewarding, rather 
than punishing, behavior.We should promote development by scaf-
folding advanced behavior. We should engage in authoritative, rather 
than authoritarian or permissive, parenting. And all of this should be 
directed toward promoting the development of self-regulation. These 
recommendations are hardly new insights, however, nor are they spe-
cific to adolescence. On the contrary, they reflect a professional con-
sensus rooted in decades of psychological theory and research on 
learning, cognition, and development. 
In this review, considering Age of opportunity as popularization, 
I provide some historical context regarding popular nativism. Then, 
turning to academic considerations, I consider the place of Steinberg’s 
theory of heightened adolescent plasticity in relation to other devel-
opmental views of the lifespan. 
Popular nativism 
Over the course of the 20th century, developmental psychology cameto 
be dominated in turn by empiricist conceptions (the behaviorist and 
other learning theories that ruled from the 1930s through the 1950s), 
then by constructivism (beginning with the rediscovery of Piaget in 
the 1960s), and finally by nativism (beginning with the neonativist 
infancy research of the 1980s). Nearly all 21st century developmen-
talists subscribe to theories that incorporate nativist, empiricist, and 
constructivist considerations, but most, even when they deny it, pri-
oritize one or two of these factors. 
At the turn of the present century, three of the leading proponents 
of neo-nativism, agreeing that their conception of developmentwas 
ready for prime time, collaborated on a popular account of what they 
took to be the extraordinary scientific competencies of infants. The 
scientist in the crib (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2001) was followed by 
The philosophical baby (Gopnik, 2009), an ode to “truth, love, and the 
meaning of life” as revealed in the minds of infants. Reviewing the lat-
ter work as a sequel to the former, I wrote in this Journal: 
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The philosophical baby is aimed at a general audience, espe-
cially parents, and is readable, informative, entertaining, and 
oftenamusing. Like its predecessor, the book presents itself 
as passing on the latest findings from developmental psy-
chology. It does indeed present interesting findings in clear 
and compelling ways.What will not be clear to the intended 
readers, however, is that what they are reading, rather than 
a consensus view of the field, is a neonativist interpretation 
(Moshman, 2011a, p. 44). 
All the same can be said of Steinberg’s Age of opportunity, which 
might be seen as extending the series to adolescence. This book too is 
readable and informative. Widely recognized as a major scholar of ad-
olescence, Steinberg is not quite as entertaining or amusing as Gopnik, 
but he has his moments. My favorite is a footnote in which he recalls: 
When a reporter once asked my opinion of a California pros-
ecutor’s initial decision in 1996 to charge a six-year-old with 
attempted murder, I said that perhaps he was trying to send 
a message to first graders all over the country. (p. 189). 
Steinberg sometimes appeals to empiricism in making the case that 
parents and schools can and should promote development. He appeals 
to the constructivist emphasis on agency in his focus on self-regula-
tion. But his overall nativism is clear throughout. Parents are seen as 
input into a maturational process that is deemed strongly related to 
age. Self-regulation, in particular, is presented as the outcome of a 
maturational process that culminates in the mid-20s in a state of ma-
ture self-regulatory ability. Psychological development is conceived as 
a process of brain maturation in which various brain systems reach 
states of maturity at predictable ages in childhood and beyond up to 
the achievement of fullmaturity around age 25. In his words, “Dif-
ferent regions of the brain develop along different timetables, and as 
a result, different abilities reach adult levels of maturity at different 
ages” (p. 200). 
Consistent with this nativist approach, Steinberg’s explanations of 
complex psychological and social phenomena are cheerfully reduc-
tionist. For example: “Why does the mere presence of friends make 
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teenagers take more chances? We found the answer inside the ado-
lescent’s brain” (p. 95). Much of the argument, moreover, relies un-
critically on animal data: “Adolescents get a dopamine squirt from-
being with their friends, just as they do fromother things thatmake 
themfeel good. It’s true in adolescent rodents as well as human ado-
lescents” (p. 98). 
Adolescent rodents? Granted, evolutionary and comparative per-
spectives are crucial to understanding mammalian puberty. Ado-
lescence, however, as a period of life that extends for years beyond 
puberty, is a cultural phenomenon of modern human societies (Mosh-
man, 2011b, 2013). In the traditional societies for which evolution has 
prepared us (and our brains), individuals in their teens were expected 
to function at mature levels as members of their social groups. Given 
that evolution proceeds over thousands of generations, it is difficult 
to see how “adolescent” rodents or the evolution of the brain relate 
to the rapidly expanding adolescence associated with human cultural 
changes of the past 150 years. 
But Steinberg is ready to proclaim “lessons from the new science of 
adolescence”: “We should devote fewer resources to trying to change 
how adolescents think, and focus instead on limiting opportunities for 
their inherently immature judgment to hurt them or others” (p. 105). 
That is, “Some things just take time to develop, and mature judgment 
is one of them. While our kids are maturing, we must protect them 
from themselves” (p. 106). 
By “kids,” of course, Steinberg means adolescents, and by adoles-
cents he means people up to about age 25. In the tradition of Gopnik, 
what Steinberg has provided for the public is “a kinder, gentler nativ-
ism” (Moshman, 2011a). His maturational conception of development, 
however, posits a much later point of maturity than do standard neo-
nativists and most other developmental theorists, and is used to justify 
an extended period of parental and societal protection and restriction. 
Patterns of developmental change 
A major feature of Steinberg’s approach to adolescence is looking 
at adolescence in lifespan perspective. Developmental research and 
theory rest on diverse assumptions about the lifespan pattern of 
David  Moshman in  J.  Appl .  Dev.  Psycholo gy  42  (2016)       5
developmental change. Steinberg, who is far from a standard neo-
nativist, can be seen as proposing an alternative to four current view-
points concerning the pattern of development across the lifespan. 
In standard neonativism, the first view, development is primarily a 
phenomenon of infancy and early childhood. Changes in later child-
hood and beyond are mostly a matter of learning and largely specific 
to particular experiences and cultural contexts. Development in this 
view is a genetically guided maturational process leading in just a few 
years in any normal human environment to universal states of matu-
rity (Gopnik, 2009; Gopnik et al., 2001). 
Second, in the standard child development view, development takes 
place across childhood and perhaps early adolescence. Changes beyond 
early adolescence are mostly a matter of learning and largely spe-
cific to particular experiences and cultural contexts. Developmental-
ists who take this view see extensive evidence for age-related progress 
beyond the preschool years toward universal states of maturity gen-
erally achieved by early adolescence (e.g., Miller, 2012; Pillow, 2012). 
The third view shares with the standard child development view a 
vision of development across childhood but, in amove toward a lifes-
pan perspective, see greater possibilities for extended development 
through the teen years and beyond (Moshman, 2011b, 2015). Devel-
opment becomesmore variable in rate and pluralist in direction after 
childhood but often continues at least through early adulthood in at 
least some contexts. Development here still refers to changes that are 
extended, self-regulated, qualitative, and progressive. Developmental 
changes beyond childhood are not inevitable, however, and do not re-
sult in universally achieved states of maturity. 
Finally, lifespan developmentalists argue that development ismul-
tidirectional and occurs across the entire lifespan, further undermin-
ing notions of universality and maturity. Development is construed to 
refer broadly to changes that are extended and self-regulated even if 
they are not qualitative or progressive. 
Steinberg proposes what can be considered a fifth view: extended 
adolescence as the new zero-to-three. In this view, adolescence, which 
he sees as roughly the period from age 10 to 25 years, is the second 
major period of developmental plasticity, following the plasticity of 
the first three years. 
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Periods of heightened brain plasticity are times when our 
experiences are likely to have enduring effects. We have 
known for some time that the first few years of life constitute 
one such period. We now know that adolescence is another. 
(p. 217). 
Thus Steinberg sees the lifespan in four stages: a stage of infancy 
involving major developmental change, a stage of relative stasis from 
about age 3 to 10 years, another stage of major developmental change 
from about age 10 years through the mid-20s, and then an adult stage 
of relative stasis. In contrast to standard neo-nativism he believes 
there is later development. In contrast to the standard child develop-
ment view, he sees middle childhood as relatively unimportant com-
pared to what precedes and follows it. In contrast to the extended de-
velopment view, he sees adolescence as a biologically distinct stage of 
progress toward a universally achieved state of adult maturity. And in 
contrast to lifespan conceptions, he believes there is a sharp decline 
in the mid-20s in the potential for developmental change. 
Steinberg’s analysis is a helpful contribution for those already 
aware of the theoretical alternatives and prepared to think critically. 
As with Gopnik (2009; Gopnik et al., 2001), however, this is not the 
“lessons” from a “new science” that it claims to be.  
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